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1 Introduction
Algebras of events are closed under finite unions; σ-algebras are closed under
countable unions. It is well-known that algebras are not rich enough for most
purposes in probability theory. It is slightly less known—but trivial—that
they are not rich enough to model an agents’ information.
Researchers in statistics, finance and economics use σ-algebras to model
an agents’ information because σ-algebras allow the use of probability-theory
tools. We point out that, as a model of information, σ-algebras are just as
problematic as algebras.
We present a simple example where the use of σ-algebras as a model of
information leads to a paradoxical conclusion: a decision maker prefers less
information to more. We then explain why the problem arises, and provide
a characterization of the different models of information in the literature in
terms of Blackwell’s Theorem.
1.1 The Example
Let the state of the world be a real number between 0 and 1, so the set
of possible states is Ω = [0, 1]. Suppose that a decision maker can choose
to either be perfectly informed, so that she gets to know the exact value
of ω, or only be told if the true ω is smaller or larger than 1/2. In the
first case, the information can be modeled as the partition of all elements of
Ω, τ = {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}. In the second case, the information is the partition
τ ′ = {[0, 1/2) ; [1/2, 1]}.
a) Suppose we were to model the informational content of τ and τ ′ by
the algebras generated by τ and τ ′; denote these by A(τ) and A(τ ′). It is
easy to see that A(τ ′) = {∅; Ω; [0, 1/2) ; [1/2, 1]}, while A(τ) is the collection
of sets in [0, 1] that are either finite or have finite complement.
The first problem with algebras as a model of information is that A(τ)
is not finer than A(τ ′): a decision maker with information A(τ ′) may get to
learn that the event [0, 1/2) has happened; a decision maker with informa-
tion A(τ) never learns if [0, 1/2) has happened or not because [0, 1/2) /∈ A(τ).
The second—and more important—problem with algebras as a model of in-
formation is that it can predict the wrong choice by a decision maker.
Suppose the decision maker is a risk-neutral expected-utility maximizer.
The individual must first choose between τ and τ ′, and then decide to buy
either a bond or a stock. The return on the stock is S(ω) = ω. The bond
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yields 3/8 in every state of the world. Suppose in addition that the state of
the world is chosen according to a uniform distribution on [0, 1].
The decision maker evaluates S according to E(S|A (τ)) (or E(S|A (τ ′))),
as the conditional expectation is the decision maker’s prediction based on
the informational content of τ or τ ′. Since E (S|A (τ)), viewed as a random
variable, must be measurable with respect to A(τ)—which consists of events
with probability 0 or 1 (i.e. essentially of {∅, Ω})—it must be a.s. constant
and equal to 1/2. See the appendix for a proof. It is immediate that
E(S|A (τ ′)) (ω) =
{
1/4 if ω < 1/2
3/4 otherwise.
In almost every state of the world E (S|A (τ)) = 1/2 is larger than the
return to the bond (3/8), so if the individual decides to observe information
τ she will a.s. buy the stock. The expected utility of choosing τ is thus 1/2.
On the other hand if she chooses τ ′, she will buy the bond when ω < 1/2 and
the stock if ω ≥ 1/2, and will thus get a utility of (3/8)(1/2) + (3/4)(1/2) =
9/16 > 1/2.
Then, while τ is obviously more informative than τ ′, the decision maker
strictly prefers τ ′ over τ . The reason is that the algebra generated by τ , and
used in forming E (S|A (τ)), is not informative at all: it is a collection of
trivial sets, having either probability 0 or 1. The algebra generated by τ ′, on
the other hand, distinguishes [0, 1/2) from [1/2, 1].
b) The problem discussed in a) does not disappear if we use σ-algebras
instead of algebras: Suppose that the decision maker evaluates S according
to E(S|σ (τ)) or E(S|σ (τ ′)), where σ(τ) is the σ-algebra generated by τ . 1 It
is till true (see the appendix) that E (S|σ (τ)) = 1/2 a.s., while E(S|σ (τ ′))
is 1/4 on [0, 1/2) and 3/4 on [1/2, 1]. If the individual decides to observe
information τ she will a.s. buy the stock—the expected utility of choosing τ
is 1/2, and the decision-maker still prefers τ ′ over τ .
The problem now is that σ(τ) is still trivial; it is the collection of sets
that are either countable or have countable complement.
1Alternatively, one may use σ−algebras generated by signals (random variables) associ-
ated to the two information structures. As we discuss in section 3.1, the same phenomenon
shows up. See our comment in 3.4 for a third interpretation of the informational content
of σ-algebras.
3
1.2 Our point.
The problem in our example is that finer partitions need not generate finer
algebras or σ-algebras. We show below that algebras and σ-algebras do not
preserve information because they are not closed under arbitrary unions.
Heuristically, if the decision maker “knows” that some collection E of events
is false, she should “know” that their union is false. If E is infinite, however,
the union of events in E need not be in the algebra, and if E is uncountable,
the union of events in E need not be in the σ-algebra.
As is well-known, there are many technical problems with “‘large” σ-
algebras—and closedness under arbitrary unions would generally deliver large
σ-algebras. We have no solution to offer, but we think it is important to
document and explain these problems with the interpretation of σ-algebras.
We do not argue that using σ-algebras as the informational content of
signals is always inappropriate. We only want to emphasize that one should
be careful when using σ-algebras as the informational content of signals. We
believe that this is relevant, as even technically able economists ignore the
problems we emphasize (see the discussion in Section 3).
1.3 Notation and Definitions
A partition τ of a set Ω is a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets whose
union is Ω; note that for each state of nature ω there is a unique element of
τ that contains ω. A decision maker whose information is represented by τ
is informed only that the element of τ that contains the true state of nature
has occurred. In other words, the decision maker cannot distinguish between
states that belong to the same element of τ . If τ , τ ′ are partitions, say that
τ ′ is finer than τ , written τ ′ ≥ τ , if for every C ∈ τ ′ there is B in τ such
that C ⊆ B. For any collection C of subsets of Ω, the σ-algebra generated
by C, denoted σ(C), is the smallest σ-algebra that contains C.
We can define information structures to be signals f : Ω → Y , for some set
Y of observable signal values. This way of modeling information is equivalent
to using partitions: each signal generates a partition, and each partition can
be interpreted as a signal. Define the partition Pf of Ω associated to f by
Pf =
{
f−1(y) : y ∈ Y
}
.
A pair (Ω,F), where F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω, is a measurable
space. Let (Ω,F) and (Y,G) be two measurable spaces. A function f : Ω →
4
Y is measurable if f−1 (B) ∈ F for all B ∈ G. The σ-algebra generated by
f , denoted σ(f,G), is the smallest σ-algebra on Ω for which f is measurable.
We say that a σ-algebra B on Y distinguishes f if for all ω ∈ Ω, f (ω) ∈ B.
For a given set of states of nature Ω and an arbitrary measurable set
(Y,B) , a collection α = (mω)ω∈Ω of probability measures on (Y,B) is an
experiment . If B, C are σ-algebras on Y,W respectively, a stochastic trans-
formation T is a function Q (y, E) defined for all y ∈ Y and E ∈ C which for
fixed E is a measurable function of y and for fixed y is a probability measure
on C. For any probability measure m on B, the function
M (E) =
∫
Q (y, E) dm (y)
is a probability measure on C, denoted by Tm. If α = (mω)ω∈Ω and β =
(Mω)ω∈Ω are two experiments, with mω, Mω defined on B and C respectively,
we shall say that α is sufficient for β, or β is a garbling of α, written
α  β if there exists a stochastic transformation T such that Tmω = Mω for
all ω. For f : Ω → Yf and g : Ω → Yg, we will say that g is a garbling of f if
β =
(
δg(ω)
)
is a garbling of α =
(
δf(ω)
)
. To understand this definition, notice
that an experiment is just a function from Ω to the set of probability measures
on some space (Yf ,B) . Then, a signal f : Ω → Yf can be identified with the
experiment that associates with each ω, the lottery which is degenerate in
f (ω) .
2 A Blackwell theorem.
Consider the following setup.
• Ω is the set of states of nature;
• Z is the set of consequences, Z has at least two elements;
• an act is a function a : Ω → Z, A = ZΩ is the set of all acts;
• a decision maker is a preference relation  on A ( is a complete
transitive binary relation on A).
The information structures available to a decision maker are signals f :
Ω → Yf for some space Yf . The decision maker is informed of the value taken
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by f and she must then choose a consequence in Z. An act a : Ω → Z is
f -feasible if a(ω) = a(ω′) whenever f(ω) = f(ω′).
A decision maker  prefers signal f to g if and only if, for any g-feasible
act a, there exists a f -feasible act a˜ such that a˜  a.
Theorem A. Let f : Ω → Yf and g : Ω → Yg. The following are equivalent.
1. Every decision maker prefers f to g;
2. Pf is finer than Pg;
3. There is h : Yf → Yg such that g = h ◦ f ;
4. g is a garbling of f ;
5. the σ-algebra of arbitrary unions of elements in Pf is finer than the
σ-algebra of arbitrary unions of elements in Pg.
6. for all σ−algebras B, C on Yf , Yg that distinguish f and g, and are
closed under arbitrary unions, σ (f,B) is finer than σ (g, C) .
Remark 1. Blackwell’s (1951) Theorem is the equivalence of 1 and 4, in the
context of “noisy signals”: his experiments are functions from Ω to the set
of probability measures on some space X. By enlarging the state-space, his
context can be embedded in ours, but the statement in Blackwell (1951) does
not follow from our Theorem A applied to the enlarged state-space. On the
other hand, Blackwell’s theorem does not imply 1 ⇔ 4 in the present context,
as his theorem was for a finite state space (this is also true of the version in
Blackwell (1953)). Therefore, neither theorem is more general.
Remark 2. We believe that the equivalence of 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Theorem A
is known, but we are unaware of a statement or proof in print. In any case,
we are interested in the equivalence of 1 with 5 and 6 as an explanation of
our example in 1.1.
Theorem A explains the paradox in our example. Signal τ is more in-
formative than τ ′, but the σ-algebra generated by τ is not finer than the
σ-algebra generated by τ ′. The root of the problem is very simple: if the
decision maker knows that no ω with ω < 1/2 has occurred, any model
of information should prescribe that the decision maker knows that [0, 1/2)
has not occurred. But, if one models the decision maker’s information as
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σ (τ), the decision maker can never “know” that the event [0, 1/2) occurred
or not, as [0, 1/2) /∈ σ (τ). Knowledge is closed under arbitrary unions, but
σ−algebras need not be.
3 Discussion
1. A common alternative to modeling the information content of a signal
f : Ω → Yf , when Yf is endowed with a σ-algebra C, is σ (f, C), the σ-algebra
generated by f . By Theorem A this construction will preserve information
if σ-algebras on target spaces are closed under arbitrary unions. If this is
not the case, it is easy to generate examples where σ (f, C) does not preserve
information. In fact, by choosing the σ-algebras C and B on target spaces
appropriately, we can reproduce the example in the introduction with signals
f , g, and conditional expectations E(S|σ (f, C)) and E(S|σ (g,B)). 2
As an illustration, consider the following situation. Suppose Yf = Yg =
[0, 1] , and let F be any σ-algebra of subsets of [0, 1] such that {1} ∈ F 6= 2[0,1].
If f : Ω → Yf is the identity, and g = χE for some E ∈ 2
[0,1]\F , we obtain
σ(f,F) = F , and σ(g,F) = {∅, E, Ec, [0, 1]}. Thus σ(f,F) and σ(g,F) are
not comparable, while f is more informative than g.
This example shows the same problems as those in the introduction may
arise when F is chosen appropriately. The results of Blackwell (1956) show
that under some regularity conditions on (Ω,B) and the σ−algebras on Yf
and Yg, the σ−algebra generated by f is finer than that generated by g.
This raises the issue of what σ−algebra should be used on the target space.
Unfortunately, we do not have a preference-based theory for selecting among
alternative σ−algebras on target spaces. 3 An additional problem with using
σ(f,F) as the informational content of f , is that σ(f,F) changes when F
changes, even though the informational content of f does not.
One could interpret C as the events that the decision maker can observe,
and use this interpretation in order to choose among different σ-algebras on
the target spaces. But then C should also be closed under arbitrary unions,
both to preserve information (Theorem A) and because “perception”—much
2The signals f, g : Ω → Ω, where f is the identity and g is the indicator function of
the interval [0, 1/2) work, when Ω is endowed with the countable-co-countable σ-algebra.
Signal f is more informative than g, but the decision maker ends up preferring g.
3We thank Larry Epstein, Peter Fishburn, Itzak Gilboa, Massimo Marinacci and Peter
Wakker for their feedback on this issue.
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like “knowledge”— should be closed under arbitrary unions.
2. When Ω is countable, Theorem A shows that σ-algebras preserve in-
formation, as any union of sets in Ω can at most be countable. Many
models, though, require an uncountable number of states of nature. This
is the case, for example, of Savage’s model of decision under uncertainty
(if we want subjective probabilities to be countably additive, as is usually
the case in economics), or of games of incomplete information (Mertens and
Zamir 1985, Brandenburger and Dekel 1993). In other models, an uncount-
able space is necessary to use calculus methods.
3. The information-preserving σ-algebras of arbitrary unions have two well-
known disadvantages (see e.g. Dudley (1989)): they may be too large for
some countably additive measures to be well-defined, and they have no clear
links to the spaces’ topological properties, like the Borel.
4. Stinchcombe (1990) proves that, in the spaces that Blackwell (1956)
introduced, a countably generated σ-algebra F can be identified with the
partition
{∩ {B : B ∈ F , ω ∈ B} : ω ∈ Ω}
of its atoms , and that all σ-algebras are “close” to a countably generated
σ-algebra. 4 In this particular sense, then, arbitrary σ-algebras possess an
informational content.
5. Our example has some similarities with Example 4.10 in Billingsley (1995).
Billingsley argues that the interpretation of σ-algebras as information is
weak, using the following argument. First, he notices that the countable-
co-countable σ-algebra F generates the finest partition of [0, 1] (two states
belong to the same element of the partition if no B ∈ F distinguishes be-
tween them). In that sense, F contains “all the information”. Second, he
notices that for every B ∈ F and any Lebesgue measurable C, the Lebesgue
probability of C conditional on B is just the Lebesgue probability of C. In
that sense, F contains no information at all.
There is one important difference between Billingsley’s example and our
example: we argue that what makes the connection between information and
σ-algebras weak is that finer partitions need not generate finer σ-algebras;
Billingsley’s argument is concerned with the partitions generated by σ-algebras.
This distinction is relevant because different partitions generate different σ-
algebras, but different σ-algebras may generate the same partition. In par-
ticular, Billingsley’s example does not imply that Blackwell’s theorem is false
4We are grateful to Maxwell Stinchcombe for pointing this out.
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when information is modeled as σ-algebras—our example does.
5. The results in this paper are very simple, the question remains if they are
not “known,” or part of some oral tradition—we are confident they have not
appeared in print. Yannelis (1991) claims that finer partitions generate finer
σ-algebras. We do not wish to claim that any of his results are false, but we
do believe Yannelis’ paper is proof that our points are original.
4 Appendix
Proof of E (S|σ (τ)) = 1/2 in the example of the introduction. We shall
show that any version of E (S|σ (τ)) is a.s. equal to 1/2. Let j : Ω → R be any
version of E (S|σ (τ)). We shall show that j−1(1/2, +∞) and j−1(−∞, 1/2)
are countable sets; this suffices as countable sets have probability zero. We
first show that, for arbitrary natural n, j−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
, +∞
)
is countable. Sup-
pose it is uncountable, then (j−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
, +∞
)
)c is countable, because j is
σ(τ)-measurable and σ(τ) is the countable-co-countable σ-algebra. Then
j−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
, +∞
)
has measure one and we obtain,
1
2
=
∫
j−1[ 1
2
+ 1
n
,+∞)
j(ω)dP (ω) ≥
∫
j−1[ 1
2
+ 1
n
,+∞)
(
1
2
+
1
n
)
dP =
1
2
+
1
n
,
a contradiction. That j−1
(
1
2
, +∞
)
is countable follows, as
j−1 (1/2, +∞) =
⋃
n
j−1 [1/2 + 1/n, +∞) .
Similarly, j−1 (−∞, 1/2) is countable. 
The proof of E (S|A (τ)) = 1/2 a.s. is to repeat the steps above, with the
difference that now j−1
[
1
2
+ 1
n
, +∞
)
is finite.
A more subtle point is that the conditional expectation with respect to an
algebra is not guaranteed to exist by the conventional theory of conditional
expectation. 5 In our example, the conditional expectations E (S|A (τ)) and
E (S|A (τ ′)) are well-defined.
5The theory uses the Radon-Nykodim Theorem. There are versions of the Radon-
Nykodim Theorem for measures on algebras—see Berti, Regazzini, and Rigo (1992)—but
we do not know that they give an existence theorem for conditional expectations with
respect to an algebra.
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Proof of Theorem A. (2 ⇒ 1). If Pf ≥ Pg, all g-feasible acts are f -
feasible. The result is immediate. To prove (1 ⇒ 2), suppose, by way of
contradiction, that Pf is not finer than Pg. Then there exist ω and ω
′ such
that f(ω) = f(ω′) but g(ω) 6= g(ω′). Define, for x 6= y the following act
a (ω′′) =
{
x if g(ω′′) = g(ω)
y otherwise
Note that a is g-feasible but not f -feasible. Let  be a decision maker such
that a  a˜ for all a˜ ∈ A. There is no f -feasible a˜ ∈ A such that a˜  a, so 
does not prefer f to g.
(2 ⇒ 3) Suppose Pf ≥ Pg. For each z ∈ g (Ω) let Y
z
f = f (g
−1 (z)) and let z˜
be any element in Z. It is easy to check that for
h (y) =
{
z if y ∈ Y zf for some z in g (Ω)
z˜ otherwise
we have h ◦ f = g.
(3 ⇒ 2) If it is not the case that Pf ≥ Pg, there exist ω and ω
′ such that ω
and ω′ are in the same element of Pf but not of Pg. Then, for all h : Yf → Yg,
h (f (ω)) = h (f (ω′)) but g (ω) 6= g (ω′)
so h ◦ f 6= g.
(2 ⇒ 4). Notice that Q (y, ·) = δgf−1(y) (·) satisfies
Tδf(ω) (E) =
∫
Q (y, E) dδf(ω) (y) = Q (f (ω) , E)
= δgf−1(f(ω)) (E) = δg(ω) (E)
as was sought.
(4 ⇒ 2). By hypothesis, δg(ω)(E) =
∫
Q(y, E)dδf(ω)(y) for some Q. Then,
f(ω) = f(ω′) implies that δg(ω)(E) = δg(ω′)(E). So g(ω) = g(ω
′).
(2 ⇒ 5) If Pf ≥ Pg, for every collection of sets {Ci} in Pg, there exists a
collection {Bi} in Pf such that
⋃
i Ci =
⋃
i Bi. Thus, letting α (τ) stand for
the σ-algebra of arbitrary unions of elements in τ , α (Pg) ⊆ α (Pf ) .
(5 ⇒ 2) Suppose that it is not the case that Pf ≥ Pg. This means that there
exists a set C in Pg such that for every collection {Bi} in Pf , C 6=
⋃
i Bi.
Thus, C ∈ α (Pg) , but C /∈ α (Pf ) , a contradiction.
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(2 ⇒ 6) Suppose Pf ≥ Pg, and that c ∈ σ (g, C) . This means that there exists
C ∈ C such that c = g−1 (C) . Since Pf ≥ Pg,
c =
⋃
i∈I
pi
for some index set I and pi ∈ Pf for all i. Since B distinguishes f, f (pi) ∈ B
for all i, and since B is closed under arbitrary unions,
⋃
i∈I
f (pi) ∈ B. We then
obtain that
c = f−1
(⋃
i∈I
f (pi)
)
∈ σ (f,B) .
(6 ⇐ 2) It is easy to check that since B (C resp) distinguishes f (g resp.) ,
σ (f,B) (σ (g, C) resp.) is the collection of arbitrary unions of elements of Pf
(Pg resp.) . Therefore, for all c ∈ Pg we have c ∈ σ (g, C), and by hypothesis,
c ∈ σ (f,B) . But then, there must exist there exist a collection {pi}i∈I such
that pi ∈ Pf for all i, and c =
⋃
i∈I
pi, so Pf ≥ Pg. 
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